IN TROUBLE, IN THEORY

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1.   What is the link between trouble and theory? What kind of a question is that? Hardly a theoretical one, surely. For trouble is far from being a theoretical category. Is the question meant to be mainly a matter of language? Of the words themselves? Well, they do both begin with the letter T. That's something. And despite appearances, and despite the sound of them, they are on the way to being anagrammatically close, I suppose, with four letters in common: T O R E. From which you can make the word *rote*, which is fair enough for this kind of mechanical, routine exercise. Not so far from *rotten,* either. Which just about sums it up. Apart from those meagre scrapings, the connection between *theory* and *trouble* is, one is tempted to say: none. And in any case *trouble* and *theory*, the two words, don't really begin with the same letter, after all *Trouble* starts with a regular T. Theory starts with a rarer th: from the Greek letter theta—θ. The word does come from ancient Greek. From the verb *theôrein* (θεωρειν), meaning to watch or to look at something. Theory is the view from a vantage point: not in the throes, but looking on from a distance.

2.   Which cannot be said for *trouble*—not in any way, shape or form. Because normally, in its everyday manifestations, trouble is surely a mess. Never mind the meaning, it's already a sloppy word syntactically, shifting about between verb and noun. What troubles you? But then again, What's the trouble? The trouble's the trouble, that's what. No—unlike theory, there's nothing classical or objectively distant about trouble. Sloppy like liquid, too—*troubled* waters. All over the place.

3.   Its origins are vaguer, too. Trouble is Middle English, via Old French. But the etymology given in the Oxford English Dictionary does provide, in addition, a glimpse of a grander pedigree, one that takes trouble all the way back to the Late Latin *turbulus* and *turbulare*; and even beyond, to the Classical Latin *turbidus*. As if to provide some kind of tentative clarification or rectification— some recognisably Latin words. Trouble is still *trouble,* but it acquires at least a formal kinship with tidier modern words for a comparable state of things, like *disturb* and *turbulent*.

4.   With theory, on the other hand, what's not to like? It's abstract. It's Greek. It's philosophical (often to be found in Plato). It is like lucidity in person. We know where we are with theory. We are

perhaps in the seminar room. We are safe. We are thinking and reading, we are talking intelligently, perhaps dialectically. We are sharp, cutting-edge, bright and sparkling. Speculative. Intellectual.

5.   But trouble—let's take a deep dive down there, and hope eventually to be able to pull ourselves out again. It doesn't lend itself to neat definitions because—almost by definition, as it were—it is that which defies the defining. It's a disturbance. An anxiety. It is an alien force that breaks its way into a calm scene, invasive and threatening. Or else it is an internal disorder, an illness, a madness. Unlike theory, trouble does not make sense; it goes against it. There are no boundaries.

6.   In summary—trouble-free summary—we have, first of all: Theory, way up there. Theory is a position, a perspective, out of the ways of the world with all their distractions and wrong turnings. The theorist, etymologically, is the observer, the one who looks on at a distance, who is not involved or embroiled. Who is not in trouble. Trouble, on the other side, could only intrude upon the pleasant precincts of theory, outside of time and away from the muddle that is trouble, through and through.

7.   But trouble has another side too in which it appears not just as different from, but the opposite of that negative identity. We should be more cautious before we make any assumptions about trouble having an unequivocally bad character. What I mean is that we should take the trouble to think again. And the trouble—the trouble that changes trouble itself—starts right there. *Take the trouble*. You see what I mean? Here trouble is anything but a destructive force or a state of distress. Instead, in an everyday way, it offers careful help. *She took so much trouble with it.* How nice of her.

8.   But this is still trouble, after all, so that even the reversed form, the good side, turns out to be odd, or somehow not quite right, or not quite comparable to other kinds of goodness. Let's take a closer look at what's going on here. Taking trouble, let alone taking "the" trouble, appears to refer to exactly what trouble—bad trouble, the usual trouble—is not. The taking of trouble smoothes or enables; it prevents or corrects disruption—in other words, it prevents or corrects trouble. Yet *taking* itself, in other connections, away from trouble, is generally a bad thing—in contrast to giving, which is what is good. So trouble, it turns out, has the singular quality of conferring virtue on someone who takes it. And in a similarly confusing way, if you "give" trouble, that is a bad thing, the opposite of the usually virtuous associations of giving. She gave me a lot of trouble. How annoying of her! Give and take—the most ordinary to and fro of human interchange. This is not how

we are used to seeing either giving or taking, when taking is theft and giving is goodness. Once again, trouble upends the normal order of things. Or muddles it, troubles it.

9.   An 1890s tourist guide to fashionable London offers a succinct account of one type of trouble-giving and thereby troublemaking scenario, and concludes with a recommendation for what is acknowledged as being in reality the bad, disobliging behaviour of "giving" trouble. The author is reporting on complaints about what he refers to, with would-be French *hauteur* for his English readers, as "the system of *chiffres connus*". He means what was then the fairly new practice of putting labels on merchandise to show (and thus make known) their price, thereby removing either the need or the possibility of bargaining. This might, it has been suggested to him, be thought to have taken away the fun, to have "robbed shopping of its charm and pleasure". Not at all, it would seem; on the contrary, "we are told that there is still plenty of enjoyment to be got out of "a drapery expedition," provided the ideal lady shopper has no foolish compunction about giving trouble".[1]

10.   What does this mean? It means that such a lady "will cultivate a coolness of manner that overwhelms". Furthermore:

> As regards "giving trouble," the advice is, we are assured, altogether uncalled for. "Did you find what you wanted, dear?" one lady was overheard to ask another. "Yes," was the reply, "they had it in seven different shops." "Let me see it," said the first lady. "Oh! I didn't buy it," was the reply.[2]

Giving trouble is isolated in scare-quotes, as if to point out that it does not go without saying, neither the practice nor the phrase itself. But the inverted commas also suggest a familiar kind of situation, with well-rehearsed but awkward arguments for how not to worry about it. In the weary joke at the end of the anecdote, it turns out that the lady in question bought nothing at all, even after all the trouble she had "given" in each of the seven shops. The trouble is given at the expense of the long-suffering shop assistants who, in return, are obliged to "take" the trouble that the unpurchasing customer imposes on their goodwill.

11.   In scenes such as these, trouble troubles the usual semantic rules of the verbs involved, even as some of its practitioners violate the norms of decent customer behaviour. Yet despite the divergence, in-store trouble goes on being both given and taken. It is not the result of the will or agency of its participants on either side of the counter, who are all caught up in the coils and toils of everyday practices and everyday linguistic usage. You may give or take trouble, as a customer or a shop as-

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1 Charles Eyre Pascoe, *London of To-Day: An Illustrated Handbook for the Season, 1892* (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent, & Co., Ltd., 1892), 381.

2 *Ibid.*

sistant, and in some circumstances you may give (or take) way too much of it, beyond either the call of duty or the conventions of the considerate consumer. But even so, you are within the bounds of a recognised role: the exchange is entirely normal, and this is a known setting with its expected forms of behaviour.[3]

12.   Such disturbances, moreover, can easily pass without notice. After all, the kindness of "taking trouble", for all its double semantic strangeness, is normal behaviour, and the same applies to the giving of it, even if it is not a present that anyone would ever be grateful for. But trouble also has a more archaic resonance, one which deeply undermines what then looks like the merely surface appearances of social life. This darker and deeper trouble comes out in two famous moments from Shakespeare's plays. The first is from what is perhaps Hamlet's most famous monologue—"To be, or not to be, that is the question…"—in which he goes on to ask:

> Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
> The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
> Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
> And by opposing end them?[4]

Commentators across the centuries have pondered the question of what kind of opposition might be meant or possible. A "sea" of troubles does not appear to be something that could be overcome by any form of action against it, let alone on the part of an individual on their own. Arms may defeat the arms of other men—an arrow for an arrow, or a sling for a sling. But a sea continues its surge, indifferent to protest or intervention. A sea of troubles is beyond remedy; it is overwhelming.

13.   Trouble, or troubles, seen and felt in this way, are intractable: drowning all resistance, blocking out other views, resisting all rational measure. For anyone, on their own, in their one life: "Yesterday, all my troubles seemed so far away; /Now it looks as though they're here to stay"—in the words of the Beatles' song from the mid-1960s. For a country, riven by strife. "The" Troubles of Ireland, in the decades before independence from Britain in 1921.[5] And then, decades later, exact same phrase, "the" Troubles of Northern Ireland, in the late twentieth century, the troubles that have obliterated some of the memory of those that came before them. The sea of troubles takes over, excessive, overflowing, in its own boundless element, an oncoming and irresistible force.

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3   On the scenarios and roles of the shop, see Rachel Bowlby, *Back to the Shops: The High Street in History and the Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), especially chapter 19, "Scenes of Shopping", 166-180.
4   William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, ed. G.R. Hibbard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), Act III, scene 1, lines 57-60.
5   For the earlier Irish "Troubles", see e.g. *Seventy Years Young: Memories of Elizabeth, Countess of Fingall*, told to Pamela Hinkson (1937; Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1991).

Something like this occurs too in the other memorable show of Shakespearean troubles, which is spelled out in the cursing voices of the three witches of *Macbeth*:

> Double, double toil and trouble;
>
> Fire burn and caldron bubble.

There follows a kind of incantatory recipe, giving details of the pot-boil ingredients for what dreadful things are to come:

> Fillet of a fenny snake,
>
> In the caldron boil and bake;
>
> Eye of newt and toe of frog,
>
> Wool of bat and tongue of dog,
>
> Adder's fork and blind-worm's sting,
>
> Lizard's leg and howlet's wing,
>
> For a charm of powerful trouble,
>
> Like a hell-broth boil and bubble.
>
> Double, double toil and trouble;
>
> Fire burn and caldron bubble.[6]

The two-line refrain (which is later repeated a third time) brings out the surging mix of the words in their multiple connections—what they do, what they say, how they sound together, as double and trouble and bubble are all stirred up in the cauldron of cursing language. Whatever their role may be in making or baking the future events that their words portend, the witches' fateful concoction troubles and bubbles and toils, with a power that is sourced and sauced in its language, an antithetical "charm" that consists "of powerful trouble". As much as the evocatively horrible animal body bits that are evoked, it is the words as words that combine to do the witches' negative work. "Double, double", the same word twice, enacts the repetition that it both is and names, as well as indicating its rhyming affinity with the "trouble" that ends the same short line and the bubble that comes in the next one.

6   Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, ed. Nicholas Brooke (Oxford: Oxford World's Classics, 1990), Act IV, scene 1, 10-21.

14.   The turbulent and tumultuous waters of Hamlet's sea can be linked to another aspect of trouble, this time French. In Littré's nineteenth-century dictionary the primary meaning given for the adjective *trouble* is explicitly fluid: "TROUBLE, *adj*. En parlant des liquides, qui n'est pas clair". And then the first figurative example: "Pêcher en eau trouble, profiter du désordre des affaires d'un autre ou des affaires publiques pour s'enrichir". Far from the dramatic outpourings of Hamlet, the implied context here is not one of high tides or a watery grave, so much as a (relatively) simple absence of clarity: "Voir trouble, ne pas voir nettement". What is *trouble* (as in the French adjective) may well be obscure or murky—in the sense of "suspicious", but also in the sense of not being clear or transparent, and thus of having no explanation: "Qui est louche, qui ne s'explique pas". It is as if troubled water, troubled or troublesome things, were—almost by definition—a force that obscured or overwhelmed the clarity of theory. And theory trouble would be, in some fundamental sense, tautological, inasmuch as all trouble is a troubling of what therefore cannot be theory, or cannot remain as theory—far away from it all, trouble-free. Theory trouble—trouble in person, all around you, here to stay. Double trouble. Double double. Trouble trouble.

15.   Yet we might also ask whether theory without trouble—without disturbance, without the giving or taking of toil and thought—would have any point to it. For when something called "theory"—the word and the practice—made its entry onto the philosophical and academic stage, several decades ago, it was precisely as the source of and catalyst for a shake-up, an event. It was a deliberate troubling of the settled scenes of critical and philosophical life that were then in place (or so the claim was abruptly and often arrogantly made on theory's behalf). Far from being the vantage point of eternal quiescence and perspectival distance, the theory that was *theory* was meant as a dramatic intervention. Almost explicitly, its mission was to make trouble in settled and stagnant academic waters.

16.   As a gentle troubling of *this* story, however, it should also be said that it offers only an outline, not to say caricatural history, as seen from the English-speaking point of view. It is a view of theory as having been at first an exuberant translation of the French structuralist and after-structuralist critical thinking of the 1960s and 1970s, above all. Theory, in this context, with all its radically troubling capacities, was both presented and regarded as being French in both its texts and its geographical origin. But in France itself, the Anglo-American versions or translations of (what was not there called) theory were at first taken to be entirely derivative, if not erroneous; most of the time they were just ignored—unregarded and unknown. It was only much later that theory in English, theory that originated from the UK and the US, came into its own, in a further now Francophone guise.

This happened initially when "queer theory", so called in both English and French, was repurposed and re-presented for use in French and in France. It then appeared as a distinctive orientation of thinking now ready to make its own mark in the French intellectual contexts from which its own intellectual if not political beginnings had been so deliberately drawn. And at this juncture, something designated "French theory", *entre guillements*, started to make its way into the middle of sentences otherwise written in… French.

17. 　　*French Theory* even appeared as the title of a work that was written wholly in that language. First published in 2003, François Cusset's book sold well enough to be reissued by La Découverte in a *poche* edition two years later. As if to make up for the likely enigma of the English of the primary title, the subtitle of *French Theory* contains so many words that it comes across as almost a chapter in its own right: *Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze & Cie et les mutations de la vie intellectuelle aux États-Unis*. For it is true that on their own, those two non-French words would have been meaningless in French—let alone as the name of a book in French. But perhaps too it is only at a distance, away from France, or French, or the French, that anything going by the non-French name of French theory might ever have made sense—ever caused any ripples.

18. 　　When Judith Butler called her (American) book *Gender Trouble*, at the beginning of the 1990s, there was no theory in the title, only that untheoretical *trouble*—together with *gender*. Gender is a word with the same sort of socially distanced associations as theory itself. It is and was a linguistic term, distinguishing the masculine and feminine (and sometimes the neutral) of nouns; in this sense it has nothing to do with human beings—or not directly. It was and is more a technical than a conversational word, to be found primarily in grammar books. That remained the case until, in the later part of the twentieth century, the word gender was as if commissioned to serve as a general term for the social differentiations made between male and female people. The word *sex* was left to occupy the residual status of a biological as opposed to a cultural difference. Gender, that dull old grammatical divider, long confined to the textbooks, has never looked back; these days it is out in the mainstream of popular as well as academic discourse and argument.

19. 　　Butler does not bother with an elaboration of the distinction between sex and gender, which (by the time of her book) had become something like a naturalised opposition in its own right. It was taken for granted as a discursive distinction between a natural and a cultural category. On one side (according to this familiar separation) there are biological differences; and on the other, there are the social ones arbitrarily added to those in order to maintain the gendered hierarchy of patri-

archal culture.

20.   In her Preface, Butler says more about trouble than about gender. Trouble, she points out, is a word that in ordinary usage is often mixed up with women: women's troubles, women trouble; don't (if you want to be a good girl) make trouble. The witches of *Macbeth* do not show up in Butler's opening scene, whatever kind of womanhood or other possible gender they may represent or depart from. But still, the gendering of trouble as it goes on in ordinary life and talk is evoked as part of the prompt for her book and its title. Women are trouble! Trouble is in some way always ultimately about women; it seeps into every question, at every level, of what women are or do. And this book, Butler suggests, is intended to shift all this women trouble, this condemnation of women's ways, onto a different plane. It will offer to analyse or diagnose the trouble—and thereby to start to sort it out, to do something else with it.

21.   Butler does not put it so directly. But put it she does: that is, she proposes a task for the book to accomplish, a job it can do. The language she uses for this has to do with the revelation of an underlying state of things, hitherto unseen or unrecognised:

> What happens to the subject and to the stability of gender identities when the epistemic regime of presumptive heterosexuality is unmasked as that which produces and reifies those ostensible categories of ontology?

> But how can an epistemic/ontological regime be brought into question? What best way to trouble the gender categories that support gender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexuality? Consider the fate of "female trouble," that historical configuration of a nameless female indisposition which thinly veiled the notion that being female is a natural indisposition.[7]

With an epistemic regime "unmasked" and (in the second paragraph) a naturalised female trouble "thinly veiled", Butler's own rhetoric is, in every sense, revealing: it posits two layers, with a surface cover and a reality underneath. The reality that is being expounded is that there is no sure demarcation between male and female (or masculine and feminine), no clear difference between the sexes, any more than between the genders. But that blurred reality itself exists in a binary set-up whereby it only shows up as that which is concealed beneath the false appearance—the mask or the veil—of its direct opposite, what it is not. And it hardly needs saying that, just like the troubles of women trouble (as experienced by men) or just like women's troubles (as experienced by women), the veil itself has links—ties and clasps and knots—to the maintaining, if not the inauguration, of

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7   Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990), x.

culturally imposed sexual differences.

22. Butler's own mode of argument rests on the Foucauldian idea that an apparently natural category can be shown to be, in actuality, something like the opposite: as the very means by which that order of (seeming) nature is produced. But thirty years after the initial disturbance caused by the arrival of *Gender Trouble*, its deliberate disruptiveness in relation to seemingly settled sexual surfaces and its intervention into its own theoretical-philosophical times, it would be fair to say that the world of gender, the gendered world, is looking somewhat different from how it was then. Today, gender is an even more commonplace word than it already was in 1990. Where it was once mainly academic, it is now also a personal question of "who you are"—a self-defining expression that has taken on something like an existential resonance in popular culture. "Non-binary"—could there be a more abstract word?—has also become a familiar term of identity. It marks a lived rejection not just of the given gendered identity but also of the prior either/or of belonging to one or the other of (just) two sexes. At the same time, as if with the opposite impetus, "trans" designates or claims a definite social identity as being one of (the) two, either masculine or feminine, as opposed to the sex assigned to the body at birth. Here a change of identity is not a repudiation of the binary division of masculine and feminine but on the contrary it affirms it, along with the possibility of moving ("trans") from one to the other, as if across a line.

23. The tension between these two positions—either gender is inherently multiple and non-binary, or else it is clearly divided between the two categories of male and female—may be indicative in its very irresolution. Almost a hundred years ago, this is perhaps what Freud glimpsed in his own evocation of what he took to be the inescapable but normally overlooked troubles of sexual identification. In the lecture called "Femininity" ("Das Weiblichkeit"), published in 1933, Freud introduces the topic with the following example from everyday experience: "When you meet a human being, the first distinction you make is "male or female?" and you are accustomed to make the distinction with unhesitating certainty".[8] He goes on to say—against the common-sense view—that the division into two sexes is not nearly as sure or absolute as our ordinary impressions would have us think. But it is the detail of the sentence and the scene that is striking here, if we reflect on it. In effect, what Freud says is that every time we encounter a new person, we go through a process of either/or sexual placement so automatic that we only notice we do it if it fails to happen: that is, if we find we can't tell whether the person is male or female. By implication, that distinction is the

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8 Sigmund Freud, "Femininity" (1933), trans. James Strachey, in *New Introductory Lectures*, *Standard Edition*, Vol. XXII (London : Hogarth Press, 1964), 113.

baseline prior to the assignment of other differential markers of any kind—of age or class or race, for instance. In Freud's words, it is the *first* distinction. It is also purely binary (unlike those that may follow).

24.   In the normal course of things, the sexual distinction is made with "unhesitating certainty"; it is when it cannot be made that the process of classification shows up as such in a way that it otherwise does not. For Freud there is no clear binary distinction of two sexes, and so that uncertainty, the absence of sureness, *Sicherheit*, would not be wrong; it is true to the really uncertain state of things. Yet the definite distinction—the binary "male or female?" separation—is the structure by which we live. So firmly rooted in human cultural life is the differentiation—the *first* distinction— that when we cannot supply it, for ourselves or for others, then that is profoundly troubling. The division of "male or female" comes before all others; without it, all other certainties, of every degree, fall away.

25.   The brilliance of Freud's sentence, it seems to me, is that it draws attention to something that goes on, as he suggests, all the time, for everyone. We are perpetually coming across people we don't know. In that context, we classify according to a set of pre-formed cultural categories; and the primary classification, to which all the rest are secondary both hierarchically and in time, is that of sexual difference. We make this primary distinction unconsciously (in a non-Freudian sense): without being aware that we are making it. The distinction of the sexes, the binary differentiation presumed to apply to every human being, is fundamental; it precedes every other likely mode of identifying or describing to oneself the particulars of a person. But it follows from this that not to be able to determine whether this is a man or a woman provokes a feeling of disturbance. Certainty in this matter is both indispensable and precarious; it is never fully assured.

26.   Freud's paradigmatic sequence opens the way to an orientation of classifications that begins with the "first", that of sexual difference. But it is worth noting that it implies as well another choice, now one that precedes that of masculine or feminine. Before deciding if someone is a man or a woman, we have to determine that what or who we are in the process of meeting or otherwise encountering is a person. In Freud's German, as opposed to James Strachey's "another person" in the English translation, this is more explicit because the language is a touch less ordinary. Freud says *"einem anderen menschlichen Wesen"*: "another human being".[9] The being has to be person-

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9   Sigmund Freud, "Das Weiblichkeit" (1933), *Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse*, in *Gesammelte Werke* (Frankfurt am Main : Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999), vol. XV, 120-121. The full sentence in the German is this: "Männlich oder weiblich ist die erste Unterscheidung, die Sie machen, wenn Sie mit einem anderen menschlichen Wesen zusammentreffen, und Sie sind gewöhnt, diese Unterscheidung mit unbedenklicher Siche-

able, we could say: to be identified as human, and thence as a normal person, man or woman.

27.   In both versions, "another" or "*einen anderen*" places the newly encountered being in the same bracket as the one who is encountering them and making the assessment. And in this case, unlike what happens with the officially "first" distinction, there is more than one possible kind of difference. Human vs. not human may be a question of artificial intelligence or robots (is this a being who, like me, was born and will die ?), or else it may be a question of species (is this a human animal, as opposed to another kind?).

28.   Freud's casual sentence suggests something like an entire philosophy of sexual or gender difference as a matter of differentiation: the making and marking of such a difference as an ongoing process of affirmation and reaffirmation, both of one's own identity, seen as a gendered identity, and of other people's. When that affirmation is troubled, does not go forward automatically, then it shows up as such, as an act of checking that does not go without saying but has to be constantly renewed. For the rest of the time it occurs beneath the surface of conscious awareness. But it happens, all the same; and the vulnerability of the binary model, which is the framework within which we live, can manifest itself at any moment. The division is never finally settled; it is always, and indefinitely, open to disturbance and needing to be re-established.

29.   In the *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905), and elsewhere, Freud uses the word "theory" himself in connection with his own hypotheses about the understanding of sexuality. And he also, surely with a touch of humour, uses the word in relation to children's changing understandings of these things, especially in the series of short essays written in the years after the *Three Essays*, one of which even has the title "Über infantile Sexualtheorien", "On the Sexual Theories of Children". Freud's theory of these theories is that as they move through the formative months and years of earliest life, small children come up with different explanatory theories for what goes on with the bodies, including their own, that they are learning to live with and identify. The theories correspond to successive phases of infantile development, beginning with the "oral" predominance of a baby and a breast, and culminating in the pre-adult "genital" conception of sexual difference as a question of either having or lacking a penis. This is the concluding theory, the one where the child will end up as it enters the grown human world—and the one which sets in place the tenacious "male or female?" paradigm. The theory is neither true nor not true; but it is the paradigm that frames the cultural understanding of human identity.[10] And as with the exemplary scene of sighting

     rheit zu machen."

10 On Freud's theories of children's own theories (or "myths") of sexuality and identity see Rachel Bowlby, *Freudian*

another person, it remains, even if settled in theory, inherently (not contingently) troubled. To be a man is to live with the threat of losing masculinity; to be a woman is to live with the impossible hope of acquiring the masculinity she lacks.

30.   The theory is always, inevitably, in trouble. Trouble and theory, theory and trouble. An eternal partnership, a marriage forever made and unmade in theoretical heaven and hell. Never and ever to be consummated, to be broken up and then put back together again. Long live the theory of trouble —and the trouble with theory. Our troublesome, thinking future.

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